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Executive Summary 
 
• In July of 2011, South Sudan gained its independence, and is now facing 
numerous developmental challenges. Much hope is tied to the importance of 
oil as a redeeming factor, but the so-called resource curse serves as an 
effective obstacle to the development, with negative consequences such as 
inflation, currency appreciation, and corruption. The negative implications 
are numerous and the country is lacking many of the necessary institutions 
to manage these possibly negative impacts. With a history of civil war and 
political turmoil the conditions are harsh, but with good management, the oil 
can largely benefit the new country. 
• Norway, with a long history of development assistance in Sudan, is 
committed to support the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) with the 
management of the oil resources. By drawing upon expertise from its own oil 
industry, Norway seeks to assist South Sudan through various programs, 
such as the Oil for Development initiative. Key elements of the assistance is 
the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), technical 
support focusing on increased oil recovery (IOR), and building a stronger 
state capacity. The overall goal is to ensure that the people of South Sudan 
are the beneficiaries of the oil revenue.  
• To ensure that it is the broader masses that will benefit from the oil wealth, 
the GoSS must create policy cohesion within its own government while also 
working to preserve the peace with the Republic of Sudan (RoS). Moreover, 
the GoSS should increase government accountability and transparency by 
working with Norwegian and international actors, such as the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Institution (EITI). 
• The time span of oil is shorter than first predicted, so the heavily oil-reliant 
GoSS must utilize incoming revenue as a part of an economic diversification 
process. Suggested areas are agriculture, mining, and hydropower. Norway’s 
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role should be to provide technical assistance not only for an increased oil 
recovery, but also with the expansion of the hydropower industry, another 
area in which Norway has special expertise.   
• This report treats Norway as a third-party consultant whose expertise should 
be requested from the GoSS where deemed necessary. The overall goal is to 
find solutions to make the oil revenue benefit the people of South Sudan, 
while simultaneously suggest approaches to how Norwegian assistance 
might be utilized in the process of a larger economic diversification process 
that uses oil revenue to create long-term sustainable economic conditions for 
South Sudan.  
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BPD  Barrels Per Day 
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
DAC  Development Assistance Committee 
EITI  Extractive Industries Transparency Institution 
EOD  Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
GNI  Gross National Income 
GoS  Government of Sudan  
GoSS  Government of South Sudan 
GNPOC Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company 
ICC  International Criminal Court 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IOR  Increased Oil Recovery 
LDC  Less Developed Country   
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals 
MPM  Ministry of Petroleum and Mining (formerly MEM, South Sudan) 
MFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway) 
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding 
NCA  Norwegian Church Aid 
NCS  Norwegian Continental Shelf 
NOK  Norwegian Kroner 
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
NPA  Norwegian People’s Aid 
NPD  Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
NPC  National Petroleum Committee (South Sudan) 
NRC  Norwegian Refugee Council 
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OfD  Oil for Development 
PGI  Petroleum Governance Initiative  
PSA  Production Sharing Agreement 
RWI  Revenue Watch Institute 
SWF  Sovereign Wealth Fun 
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Introduction1 
 
On July 9th, 2011, South Sudan gained its independence from the Republic of Sudan 
in hopes of achieving a better future.2 News media from all over the world reported 
from South Sudan where joyful people were dancing in the streets, waving the South 
Sudanese flag as a sign of independence.3 After decades of civil war and political 
instability, the people in the streets of Juba finally thought they could see a brighter 
future. The one word on people’s lips, considered to be the redeeming factor was 
this: oil. 
The people of South Sudan knew that oil could have a vast impact. Oil had 
been discovered decades earlier in Sudan, but only in the last decade was 
considered worth extracting. Foreign oil companies such as Chevron established 
their presence and the “black gold” increasingly rose in importance for the country 
of Sudan. However, oil had also played an important causal factor in the earlier 
Second Civil War, so the people of Sudan displayed considerable amount of tension 
and incredulity toward oil solving the problems. 
There are relatively few parallels between Norway and South Sudan, but 
both countries have two things in common: a history of poverty and large reserves 
                                                        
1 Parts of the argument from this paper was published in the Norwegian newspaper 
Dagsavisen on January 18th, 2012 under the title “Usikker Oljefremtid i Sør-Sudan 
[Uncertain Oil Future in South Sudan]. On February 1st, 2012, the Norwegian Minister of 
Environment and Development wrote an editorial in response: 
http://www.dagsavisen.no/nyemeninger/alle_meninger/cat1002/subcat1041/thread2401
88/#post_240188  
2 Throughout this paper, I will refer to the united Sudan prior to July 9th, 2011 as Sudan; 
Republic of Sudan as Republic of Sudan and occasionally as ‘North’; and Republic of South 
Sudan as South Sudan and occasionally as ‘South’.  
3 Peter Martell, “South Sudan Celebrate Their Divorce,” BBC News, July 9, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14091903  
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of crude oil. In the first half of the 20th century, Norway had one of the lowest GDPs 
in Europe, but this changed with the discovery of oil in the North Sea.4 Following 
this event, the Norwegian economy grew significantly,5 which distinguishes it from 
South Sudan’s. In 2011, Norway has among the most developed welfare states in the 
world, with a reasonably equal wealth distribution through its social democratic 
system. Having a well-functioning welfare system has allowed the country to look 
outside its borders to help less developed countries (LDCs).  
One of the countries that has received the most Norwegian development 
assistance is Sudan. The Norwegian Directorate for Aid and Development (Norad), 
serving as the center of development cooperation, allocated in 2011 NOK 578 
million to Sudan.6 Norway is committed to providing assistance to South Sudan in its 
gradual process of building a more stable governmental capacity as a part of the 
larger Norwegian development assistant platform. With good public management, 
oil can open up for economic growth and public investment to promote 
macroeconomic stability.7 
The findings of this report are significant to the Governments of South Sudan 
and Norway, respectively. As a new state, South Sudan has numerous obstacles to 
overcome and should seek assistance from other states determined to lend their 
                                                        
4 Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, The Politics of the Global Oil Industry: An Introduction 
(Westport: Praeger Publisher, 2005). 
5 GDP in 1970 was NOK 91 billion and NOK 2496 in 2010. See Ola Grytten, The Gross 
Domestic Product for Norway 1930-2003, chapter 6 in Norges Bank Occasional Papers no. 35 
and Statistics Norway, “Focus on National Accounts,” http://www.ssb.no/regnskap_en/  
6 Due to currency fluctuations, the numbers are in Norwegian Kroner (NOK) for a more 
accurate number. USD 1 ~ NOK 6. These figures are from the fiscal year 2011 and do 
therefore not take into account the South’s secession.  
7 Audun Solli, “From Good Governance to Development? A Critical Perspective on the Case 
of Norway’s Oil for Development,” Forum for Development Studies, vol. 38, no. 2 (2011).  
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expertise on relevant policy areas. Norway, with its long history of both oil 
extraction and development assistance, has shown its commitment to solving the 
dispute between North and South Sudan. Norway’s efforts in helping South Sudan 
manage its natural resources and build state capacity are therefore essential to the 
new state. 
This report will address the issue of how Norwegian efforts can assist the 
Government of South Sudan (GoSS) in developing the oil industry as a part of a 
larger capacity building process. It recognizes that capacity building is a complex 
process with many layers and will, therefore, outline some of the challenges in the 
web of interconnected factors. Barriers to the development of the state include a 
long history of regional conflict, domestic instability, internal policy incoherence, 
poor diplomatic relations, and the “resource curse.”  
The report starts out by looking at the history of South Sudan. The following 
section examines the resource curse and its role in South Sudan as well as 
governmental incoherency and regional instability. The report then explores some 
of Norway’s oil history and relevant factors essential to the growth and 
development of the country. Next follows a section that explores which elements of 
Norwegian expertise can be transferred to other countries. The overall significance 
is that the oil development is a part of a larger development course, but because 
South Sudan’s oil may only last for another 10-15 years, the economy must be 
diversified, which is explored in the final section. Finally, the report proposes both 
technical solutions and policy recommendations to the respective governments for 
8
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further action to take in South Sudan, with specific emphasis on how to utilize oil 
development in the state capacity building.   
1. Oil as a Historical Cause of Instability 
This section provides a brief overview of the history of political turmoil in Sudan. In 
1820, Sudan was conquered by a coalition of Egyptian and Turkish troops. The reign 
of these two countries lasted until 1881, when the Sudanese people rebelled against 
the colonial powers. The year after, the British conquered Sudan and, from 1899 to 
1955, Sudan was controlled by a joint British-Turkish coalition. The following year, 
Sudan gained its independence, but only a year later the civil government was 
overthrown in a military coup d’état. The overthrow resulted in the beginning of the 
First Civil War between the North and the South, a war that lasted for seventeen 
years and killed several hundred thousand people. Only ten years passed after the 
Addis Ababa peace treaty until the Second Civil War erupted. The second war lasted 
from 1983 to 2005 and was even more devastating to the country with nearly 2 
million deaths.8   
Much of the background for both the wars was rooted in ethnic divisions, the 
North being largely Arab and Muslim, while the South consisting of mainly Nilotic 
people with indigenous faiths or Christian beliefs.9 The large natural resource 
reserves found on the border of today’s RoS and South Sudan further complicate the 
                                                        
8 U.S. Committee for Refugees, “Crisis in Sudan,” April 2011, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20041210024759/http://www.refugees.org/news/crisis/sud
an.htm 
9 Mohamed H Fadlalla, Short History of Sudan, (Lincoln: ¡Universe, 2004) and Ali Abdel Gadir 
Ali et al., “The Sudan’s Civil War: Why Has it Prevailed for so Long?” in Paul Collier and 
Nicholas Sambanis eds. Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Volume I: Africa 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2005).  
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issue between the two countries. Thus, what originally was a conflict due to ethnic 
and ideological differences was prolonged because of the role of resources.10  
In January of 2011, southern Sudan held a referendum resulting in their 
secession from the North. As of July 9th, 2011, southern Sudan is an independent 
state. As a new state, South Sudan faces numerous challenges. The state is largely 
underdeveloped compared to its neighbors as measured by the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG): 50 percent live below the national poverty line;11 net 
enrollment in primary schools was 46 percent, but far fewer complete all eight 
years; far more men than women are literate and enrolled in schools. A positive 
development, however, is that 36 percent of the Legislative Assembly are women; 
one of the biggest health challenges the country faces is an astronomical maternal 
mortality rate: one of seven women die in labor, making it the highest in the world.12 
 
We shall have better schools, better hospitals, and everything will be new.13 
 
Since independence, much South Sudanese hope has been tied to the oil 
development in the country, the source of 98 percent of state revenue.14 Western 
observers ties much hope to the oil reserves, while recognizing the difficult way 
                                                        
10 International Crisis Group: “God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan”, 
International Crisis Group Press, Brussels, 2002.  
11 The national poverty level is 72.9 South Sudanese pounds per month. 
12 Figures between the UN and other agencies, e.g. Save the Children differs. According to a 
recent Save the Children report only 10 percent of children complete primary school and 
one fifth of all children are acutely malnourished. See Save the Children, “South Sudan: A 
Post-Independence Agenda for Action,” Save the Children UK, London, 2011.   
13 Expressed by a female gas station attendant in Juba. Thomas Danielewitz, “South Sudan 
Launches its First GDP Estimate,” The World Bank Blog, August 23, 2011,  
http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/south-sudan-launches-its-first-gdp-estimate 
14 Matthew Brunwasser, “The Impact of Oil in Sudan,” PRI’s The World, January 14, 2011,  
http://www.theworld.org/2011/01/the-impact-of-oil-in-sudan/ 
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ahead. The fact of the matter is that the oil will likely play a key role in the future, 
just as it has in the past.  
The question is what kind of role oil will play. This report examines two key 
issues. First, South Sudan shares a great deal of tension with the North about how to 
divide the oil revenues. Chapter three of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
states that the oil should be split evenly amongst the two states, but, with 75 percent 
of the oil located in the South, the division seems unfair to the new state.15 Former 
U.S. president Jimmy Carter, who has a long-term involvement in the region, 
addressed the situation by stating:  
In the South, I think they expect to get more than 50 percent in the future. And 
in the North they hope to maintain their 50 percent.16  
 
 
Although this is certainly a contentious topic, the two states need to cooperate for 
some time as the only pipeline from the landlocked South runs through the North to 
Port Sudan, where most of the refineries are located.  
Juba has considered creating its own pipeline and has received offers from 
international contractors.17 In theory this seems like a good solution, although it 
could potentially lead to unrest when the North will no longer be able to charge the 
South for the use of their pipes and refineries, thus losing a major source of revenue. 
                                                        
15 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), full text, http://www.aec-
sudan.org/docs/cpa/cpa-en.pdf  
16 PRI’s The World 
17 Toyota Tshusho Corporation offered to construct a 1,400-km pipeline to transport crude 
oil from Juba to Lamu, Kenya. The company explained in March 2010 that the pipeline could 
transport 450,000 bpd, and would cost $1.5bn to construct. After 20 years under Toyota 
ownership, it would be handed over to the Kenyan and southern Sudanese governments for 
regional cooperation. See Reuters, “South Sudan Talked to Toyota Over Kenya Oil Pipeline,” 
Reuters, July 7, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/07/us-sudan-south-oil-
interview-idUKTRE7666MJ20110707. 
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The second greater problem, however, is that several reports suggest that the oil has 
already reached its peak or will do so in the near future, and is now in a steady 
decline.18 A recent IMF report suggests that barring new discoveries or improved 
recovery, the 2009 number will be halved by 2020.19 Hence, the challenge for South 
Sudan is to maximize the short-term oil revenues in such a way that will help 
diversify the economy for the future; in order to do this, however, they must 
overcome the so-called resource curse as one of the many development challenges 
that they face. 
 
 
2. Development Challenges 
This section explores and highlights the consequences of oil as a quick source of 
state revenue. An underlying theme of this report is that the time span of oil is short, 
perhaps another 20 years. Therefore, while planning ahead, much work must be put 
into the present management of the wealth managing and consequently limiting the 
oil’s negative consequences.20 This report focuses on three main areas: (1) potential 
resource curse; (2) governmental incoherency in policy-making; and (3) regional 
                                                        
18 The figures vary, most likely due to estimates rather than official numbers. The peak date 
goes from 2009-2012 and peak production is estimated around 360,000 bpd. United 
Nations Mission in South Sudan/Public Information Office, South Sudan Media Monitoring 
Report, Juba, 2011, http://unmiss.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7go-
9VbVijY%3D&tabid=3540&language=en-US  
19 Adolfo Barajas, “MENAP Oil Exporters: Benefiting from High Oil Prices amid Growing 
Risks,” International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2011.  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2011/mcd/eng/pdf/oilexporters.pdf  
20 The importance of the resource curse must not be understated. Evidence suggests that 
South Sudan is already elements of the curse. What is more, it is imperative to provide a 
proper analysis of the resource curse and how South Sudan can avert the negative 
implications in order to make use of the oil in the short time span of perhaps 20 years. 
Economic growth is a key factor in the process.  
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instability, especially a possible conflict with the Republic of Sudan. Juba should use 
a holistic approach toward these three issues in order to ensure a united 
government whose goal is to improve conditions for the broader South Sudanese 
social sphere. Consequently, the economy will grow stronger and the oil revenue 
will be used in the interest of the people as a whole, rather than put in the pockets of 
a few.21   
 
2.1 Resource Curse 
The “curse of natural resources,” “paradox of plenty,” or “resource curse” is a 
political economic phenomenon that often occurs in countries with great natural 
resource wealth, making the country’s economy grow slower than in a resource-
poor country.22 The examples are numerous, but countries that have experienced 
the curse include Colombia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, Liberia, and Ivory 
Coast.23 Although the economic aspect is often thought of as the main issue, the 
consequences of the curse can be subdivided into five components:24 
 
• Macroeconomic instability and export concentration. The country depends 
on a small number of exports, making it vulnerable to volatility of 
                                                        
21 Corruption is not explicitly addressed in this section, because it is beyond the scope of 
this report to go in depth about how Norway and South Sudan should go about fighting it. 
Yet, points 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 might together suggest a conceptual framework for how to 
reduce corruption.  
22Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, “Natural Resources and Economic Development,” 
European Economic Review, 45 (2001).   
23 Examples of ‘success stories’ include Botswana, Chile, Indonesia, and Norway. 
24 Todd Moss complies a list of five categories, based on individual sources. Todd Moss, “Oil-
to-Cash: Fighting the Resource Curse Through Cash Transfers,” Yale Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 6, Issue 2, (2011).  
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international prices. Consequently, the swings in economic policies lead to 
macroeconomic instability.  
• Slow growth and poverty. In the span between 1960 and 1990, the 
economies in resource-poor countries increased almost three times faster 
than those of resource-rich countries.  
• Corruption. An increase of 15 percent in the share of natural capital in a 
country’s wealth correlates to a 20 percent drop in the corruption 
perceptions index.  
• Authoritarianism. Research suggests a strong correlation between oil and 
gas dependency and authoritarian rule.  
• Conflict. In a country where primary commodity accounts for 33 percent of 
GDP, the likelihood of conflict increases to 22 percent, as in comparison to 1 
percent for countries without such exports.  
 
As these outcomes often are mutually reinforcing, the resource curse often leads to a 
downward spiral of poverty and instability.25  
Some of the problem is the lack of accountability between citizens and the 
state.26 In practical terms it creates “unearned income” for the state not having to 
tax its citizens. With the establishment of such a dynamic, the government becomes 
less inclined to respond to the needs of its citizens. Thus, a likely outcome is a 
“rentier state,” where the country is dependent upon a narrow income sector (e.g. 
                                                        
25 Todd Moss, Yale Journal of International Affairs 
26 Deborah Bräutigam, Introduction: Taxation and State-building in Developing Countries, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
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oil) but without the concerns of its citizens or wanting to reform. In sum, this 
condition widens the gap between the government and the public in a negative 
manner, while the opposite should be the case, thus impeding the capacity building 
process.  
 
2.1.1 Dutch Disease 
A sub-concept of the resource curse is “Dutch disease,” implying that the curse is not 
only limited to LDCs. The essence of Dutch disease is too much wealth managed 
unwisely. The term was coined after the Netherlands discovered large reserves of 
gas in the North Sea in the 1960s.27 The ostensibly positive discovery proved to have 
large negative consequences on the Dutch economy as the Dutch guilder grew so 
strong that non-oil commodities became less attractive for export. Applied to a 
country that just recently discovered oil, there would be no direct impact on 
demand for domestically produced goods or the country’s money supply, as long as 
the foreign exchange was only spent on imports. However, a problem arises when 
the foreign exchange is converted into local exchange and spent on domestic 
nontraded goods. The result is one of two outcomes, depending on whether the 
country’s nominal exchange rate is fixed by the central bank or is flexible.  
If the exchange rate is fixed, the conversion of the foreign currency into local currency 
would increase the country's money supply, and pressure from domestic demand 
would push up domestic prices. This would amount to an appreciation of the "real" 
exchange rate… If the exchange rate is flexible, the increased supply of foreign 
currency would drive up the value of the domestic currency, which also implies an 
appreciation in the real exchange rate, in this case through a rise in the nominal 
exchange rate rather than in domestic prices.28 
                                                        
27 Christine Ebrahim-zadeh, “Back to Basic: Too Much Wealth Managed Unwisely,” Finance 
and Development, vol. 40, no. 1 (2003).   
28 Ibid.   
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Both with fixed and flexible exchange rates, the domestic products will experience 
weakened export competitiveness, causing the traditional export sector to shrink. 
With this in mind, the Dutch disease should be avoided at any cost.   
 
2.1.2 Fluctuations in the Oil Price 
Not conventionally part of the resource curse literature, but an element of a similar 
nature are the drastic pendulum swings in the global prices on crude oil. As Figure 1 
indicates, the prices have gone from around USD 35 to USD 130 between January 
2003 and August 2008, before it dropped drastically. For states heavily reliant on oil 
export, the consequences of these swings can be fatal. The budget is then subject to 
large swings from the oil sector, making continuity in public expenditure a difficult 
challenge. Governments also tend to overcommit in years of plenty and projects that 
span over more than one fiscal year are thus in danger of not being completed due 
to insufficient funds. Empirical evidence suggests that such projects are often 
schools and healthcare, considered basic for the development of a country, such as 
South Sudan. 
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 Figure 1: The 
 Source: Reuters EcoWin, http://www.tutor2u.net/blog/files/crude_1212.gif
2.1.3 In South Sudan:30 
The question of whether South Sudan is
requires some elaboration. The abovementioned categories of consequences tied to 
the resource curse serve as a framework for answering the question.
point to certain areas that can easily be 
less connected. 
Macroeconomic deterioration 
instability with the recent financial crisis. On the one hand, the real exchange rate 
appreciated by 40 percent between 2005 and 2006, making export less co
                                                       
29 Brent crude oil is the biggest of the various oil classifications. 
30 The numbers used in this section are based on Sudan, so the actual representation of 
South Sudan might be slightly inaccurate. 
31 While the framework might oversimplify a more complex issue, it nonetheless serves as 
an indicator of cause and effect
Brent Crude Oil Price 2003 - 201129 
  
 experiencing the curse is complicated and 
31
related to the curse, while other a
has occurred largely due to external economic 
 
 
 
.  
 
 
 The results 
reas seem 
mpetitive 
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and import cheaper.32 Similarly, the share of non-oil exported commodities fell from 
24 percent in 2000 to only 8 percent in 2008. The rate of inflation, on the other hand, 
has been one of the positive macroeconomic outcomes.33 In the years between 1971 
and 1991 the average inflation rate was 33 percent compared to 8 percent since the 
advent of oil as seen from figure 2.  
The poverty levels in Sudan have increased despite a boost in the GDP. In the 
period from 1992 to 2000, the GDP had an annual increase of 7.5 percent, but 
poverty levels nonetheless rose in the country over the last several. Between the 
years 1968 and 1992, the people living below USD 1 almost doubled.34 As of 2011, 
51 percent of the population of South Sudan lives under the national poverty line. In 
the Republic of Sudan the number of people under the poverty line is 46 percent. 
The figures suggest that while the GDP has risen largely due to the oil, the wealth 
inequalities have also grown, thus, creating a large poverty segment especially in 
rural areas due to failed trickle down effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
32 World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Sudan: Toward 
Sustainable and Broad-Based Growth (2009), http://www.cmi.no/sudan/doc/?id=1275 
33 Ibid. 
34 Medani Mohmed Ahmed, “Sudan Report: Can the Sudan Achieve the MDGs Given its Past 
and Present Expenditures Allocation Patterns?” Chr. Michelsen Institute, (2008).   
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 Figure 2: Sudan Achieved
 Source: World Bank, 
http://www.cmi.no/sudan/doc/?id=1275
 
As for corruption, the ICC has accused President Omar al
siphoning off $9 billion of Sudan’s oil revenues.
statistics are not in Sudan’s favor
corruption index, Sudan was ranked in 2010 as number 172 out of 178 countries 
with a score of 1.6/10, making it among the world’s most corrupt countries
is more, Sudan has become increasingly more co
                                                       
35 BBC News, “Sudan’s President Bashir ‘Siphoned off Millions’ 
18, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world
36 The score is based on a 10-point sc
Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2010,” 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results
 Low Inflation After the Advent of Oil
Sudan: Toward Sustainable and Broad-Based Growth, 
.  
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35 For the country as a whole, the 
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rrupt since the first measure from
 
– ICC,” BBC News
-africa-12025213.   
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2002, when the country scored a 2.3. These indications seem to fit with the 
corruption prognosis, but more importantly, with the increased oil revenue.37  
Authoritarianism is a more complicated matter. For while Sudan in principle 
is a republic based on democratic values, President Omar al-Bashir came to power 
by a coup d’état and is faced with charges of crimes against humanity by the ICC.38 
The fact that he came to power before the oil extraction began makes it less clear 
whether the oil contributed to Sudan’s authoritarian regime, or if it simply 
prolonged his rule. What is clear is that al-Bashir has not sought to solve the 
resource conflict by democratic principles, suggesting that his rule has contributed 
to the authoritarianism of the resource curse.  
The conflict category is arguably the easiest factor to control for. It is 
commonly known that one of the main causes of the Second Civil War in Sudan was 
the disagreement over oil sharing. Still, after South Sudan’s independence, 
Khartoum claims possession of the Abyei Territory of the Dinka Ngok tribe because 
of the oil reserves, despite the fact that the CPA stipulated land-sharing conditions 
where a National Land Commission was set to resolve the issue. So far, no 
commission has been established, despite international pressure to solve the border 
conflict. It is imperative for the future that the land conflict be solved as large parts 
of the disputed oil reserves are located in this region; otherwise the likelihood of 
another international war will increase.   
                                                        
37 There has not yet been released any official corruption numbers from South Sudan. 
38 International Criminal Court (ICC), “ICC Prosecutor presents case against Sudanese 
President, Hassan Ahmad AL BASHIR, for genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes in Darfur,” press release, July 14, 2008, 
http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20r
eleases%20(2008)/a?lan=en-GB 
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As seen from the various categories, one can tentatively conclude that the 
resource curse is to be found in certain policy areas of Sudan. The best evidence for 
this claim is the authoritarian role of President al-Bashir and the political conflicts 
where oil has been a central issue. It is difficult to specifically draw a conclusion for 
the presence of the resource curse in South Sudan as compared to Sudan as a whole 
as there is limited data available focusing only on South Sudan.39 But with its 
underdeveloped institutions and a higher reliance on oil, the country is arguably 
more vulnerable than RoS. Looking ahead, the country must focus on avoiding or 
reverting the curse as much as possible if state capacity building is to be given a 
chance, while avoiding another war with the North.  
 
2.2 (In)Coherency in Juba 
As already outlined, it is sine qua non for South Sudan to focus on a broad capacity 
building of the state. One of the main tasks is to ensure that the policies from Juba 
are consistent with long-term strategies, and that the politicians are working 
together toward the same goal. Hence, the consequences of the resource curse and 
Dutch disease can be further avoided.  
 The incoherency is partially rooted in historical events. While the British was 
administrating present day South Sudan, they sought not to educate the local 
population in fear of a detribalized and discontent intelligentsia, thus effectively 
                                                        
39 Most of the reports available treat Sudan as one statistical entity, making it difficult to 
distinguish between North and South. For those reports dealing specifically with South 
Sudan, the figures most commonly address concerns in the sectors of health and education.  
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hindering the creation of bureaucrats and administrators.40  Although several 
generations have past, the result is today a largely uneducated population, who 
constitute a part of a national movement of trying to build up a well-functioning 
state. One author addressed the administrative conditions of the South Sudanese 
region in 1998 as “very incompetent or non-existing.”41 The situation has since then 
improved, but it speaks to a history of political incoherency and difficulties. 
 One of the current causes of incoherency is rooted in “tribal” tensions. There 
are more than sixty cultural and linguistic groups in South Sudan who all value their 
citizenship in their respective tribes more than in the nation.42 Making national 
policies when loyalty to the nation is secondary, is difficult. Especially when 
distribution of resources is a part of the equation, it is easy to favor one’s tribe 
rather than seek policy solutions that benefit the people of South Sudan as a whole. 
Post-independence violence in seven out of ten South Sudanese states highlight the 
internal tension, and although the violence has decreased over the last couple of 
months, it created further political division. This division is especially evident 
between those who did and those who did not fight in the struggle for independence. 
Those who fought feel entitled to government privileges, while those who did not 
feel excluded. Moreover, there have been reports of increased nepotism in 
government offices. With a high percentage of unemployment, tribe often trumps 
                                                        
40 Terje Tvedt, “The Collapse of the State in Southern Sudan After the Addis Ababa 
Agreement: A Study of Internal Causes and the Role of the NGOs,” in Sharif Harir and Terje 
Tvedt Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan, (Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstituttet, 1994). 
41 Volker Riehl, “Who is Ruling in South Sudan? The Role of NGOs in Rebuilding Socio-
Political Order,” Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, report no. 9, (1998). 
42 Jok Madut Jok, “Diversity, Unity, and National Building in South Sudan,” United States 
Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 2011.  
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merit when a person is applying for a government office, yet further perpetuating 
the government incoherency.  
In order for the GoSS to create unity within the nation, efforts must be 
directed at limiting nepotism and “tribal” favoritism. The government must realize 
its duty to establish national unity across tribes and ethnic groups. Up until this 
point, the external threat from the North has served as one unifying factor, but to 
create a nation, there should be a stronger emphasis on internal common 
denominators and the creation of an “imagined community”.43 Examples of common 
factors include a common language and national symbols that allow most people to 
relate to a united nation.44 It should also be stressed that, albeit “tribal” differences, 
there are historically more similarities than differences among the South Sudanese 
people. Hence, the work to create a more united government and nation should be a 
high priority for the GoSS.       
 
2.3 Regional Stability 
One of the fundamental factors for achieving sustainable development is to build on 
a foundation of peace. For South Sudan this means using diplomatic efforts to 
establish good relations with its neighboring countries of the Central African 
Republic, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Republic of Sudan, and Uganda. Issues such as 
                                                        
43 The term ‘imaged community’ is borrowed from Benedict Anderson’s famous work 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (New York: 
Verso, 1983).  
44 There is an ongoing debate concerning language. The country is divided by a lack of a 
national indigenous language and it has been suggested to either create a hybrid of a 
number of local languages or select five languages that would be elevated to a national level. 
See Jok Madut Jok, United States Institute of Peace .  
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borders and division of the oil revenue are still very contentious and could easily 
reignite another war.  
 Establishing a good relationship with the Republic of Sudan is the most 
important for preserving the peace. The oil plays a central role in this question, as 
the majority of the reserves are located close to the dividing border. The GoSS 
should, therefore, increase its efforts to continue the dialogue of how to solve the 
area dispute of the Abyei region. The CPA stipulates that Abyei was to have a 
referendum to decide whether to belong to the North or the South. It is still unclear 
when the referendum will be held, but both governments should assist the region to 
speed up the process, as peace in this region is essential to sustain good interstate 
relations.  
 Another aspect concerns the division of oil revenue. Chapter III of the CPA 
states that the oil should be divided on equal terms, but the RoS still seeks to assert 
authority over the South. Khartoum demands high fees for South Sudan’s use of 
their pipeline and oil refineries. In November of 2011, Khartoum blocked South 
Sudanese oil export through Port Sudan over a dispute on transit fees.45 The GoS 
initially planned to charge South Sudan USD 32 per barrel, which Juba swiftly 
rejected. After months of negotiations, the two governments got in December a step 
closer to reaching an agreement. Although still only a proposal, South Sudan has 
allegedly agreed to give RoS USD 2.6 billion as an economic compensation for their 
                                                        
45 Agence France Presse, “Khartoum Halts South Sudan Oil Exports,” All Africa, November 
28, 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201111301223.html. 
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loss of oil revenue.46  It is imperative for the future stability in the region that both 
sides work toward a solution for the sharing of wealth in order to both strengthen 
the economic development and preserve the peace.  
 
 
3. Norway: Assisting Less Developed Countries 
 
After Norway gained its independence from Sweden in 1905, Norwegian foreign 
policy kept a low profile as the country recognized the limitations of small-state 
bilateral policy. National consensus dictated avoiding too much international 
attention, and, as the famous Norwegian author Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson pointed out, 
“Our best foreign policy is to have no foreign policy.”47 Toward the middle of the 
century, with Norway gaining membership in NATO, Norwegian foreign policy 
shifted from “international ‘idealism’ to strategic ‘realism.’”48 Yet even during this 
time, Norway was a strong advocate of human rights and opposed to the colonial 
policies of its NATO partners.  
Norwegian international development efforts first emerged in the early 
1950s. Throughout the 50s and 60s, development was not among the high priorities 
of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). By the early 1970s, a domestic 
debate established an approach of both bilateral and multilateral efforts to reduce 
                                                        
46 “South Sudan Says Agreement Reached With Khartoum on Oil Fees,” All Africa, December 
13, 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201112140712.html.  
47 Jan Egeland, Impotent Superpower - Potent Small Power: Potentials and Limitations of 
Human Rights Objectives in the Foreign Policies of the United States and Norway, (Oslo: 
International Peace Research Institute, 1985), p. 33.  
48 Jan Egeland, International Peace Research Institute.  
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poverty, increase welfare, and create a new economic order for LDCs.49 To better 
structure their development approach, the MFA created the Norwegian Directorate 
for Aid and Development (Norad). As of 2011, Norad aims to “be the centre of 
expertise for evaluation, quality assurance and dissemination of the results of the 
Norwegian development cooperation, jointly with partners in Norway, developing 
countries and the international community”.50 Furthermore, Norad also functions to 
accomplish the development goals set out by the MFA and the Parliament. 
The Norwegian development efforts are directed towards 32 countries, but 
as many as 114 received a part of the NOK 27.1 billion (or 1.02% of GNI) that 
Stortinget allocated to development in 2011. The countries receiving the most aid 
include Brazil (NOK 1,483 million), Tanzania (749 m.), Afghanistan (726 m.), Sudan 
(705 m.), Palestine (661 m.), Pakistan (502 m.), Mozambique (443 m.), and Uganda 
(431 m.).51 Although the majority of the aid is focused on African countries, Norway 
also focuses on several Asian countries, including India and China, European 
countries, including Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and several countries in Latin 
and South America.  
 
 
4. Norway’s Oil History 
                                                        
49 Helge Pharo, “Altruism, Security and the Impact of Oil: Norway’s Foreign Economic 
Assistance Policy 1958-1971,” Contemporary European History, vol. 12, no. 4 (2003).    
50Norad, Strategy Towards 2010, (Oslo: Norad, 2010), p. 1, http://www.norad.no/en/tools-
andpublications/publications/publication/_attachment/107553?_download=true&_ts=11e
bb0f49fe 
51Norad, “Norwegian Aid Statistics,” 2010, http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-
publications/norwegian-aid-statistics. 
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Few people believed in the 1950s that the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) might 
conceal oil.52 However, oil was in 1959 discovered off of the Dutch coast, which 
consequently led to a renewed hope of finding oil on Norwegian territory. In 1963 
under Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen, the Norwegian government proclaimed 
sovereignty of the NCS and issued licenses to international oil companies to conduct 
seismic surveys. After several years of dry wells, Phillips Petroleum discovered oil in 
1969, at what today is known as the Ekofisk field. In the following years, 
international companies as opposed to the Norwegian Government played the main 
role in oil development, but the State still had the leading role in controlling the 
issues of licenses and contributing with investment for economic returns. Statoil 
was founded by the government in 1972 with the principle that the government 
would have a 50 percent participation in each license. In 1985 this principle was 
reorganized so that the State role now is decided on an ad hoc basis.  The petroleum 
industry celebrated this year its 40th year of production. Over these forty years the 
industry has generated in excess of NOK 800 billion and a 21 percent value creation 
in the country,53 due to the high extraction rate of approximately 3 million barrels 
per day for the last fifteen years.54 A large part of revenue management is due to 
                                                        
52 Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, “Norway’s Oil History in 5 Minutes,” 
November, 2010, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Subject/Oil-and-Gas/norways-
oil-history-in-5-minutes.html?id=440538. 
53 Figures are based on a 2009 value index. 
54Between 1995 and 2001 the production was at 3 million bpd with a peak in 2001 of 3.4 
million bpd. As of 2009, the production has been at 2.4 million bpd. The estimates for the 
future will most likely shrink in terms of oil, but rise in absolute terms due to large 
discoveries of natural gas liquids (NGL).  
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effective institutions and good governance, which are both also seen as key factors 
in preventing a resource curse.55 
 
 
4.1 Success Factors 
The success in managing Norway’s oil industry relies on several factors. Policy-
makers from all over the world have looked to Norway for advice on how to go 
about developing the oil industry in their respective countries, but one cannot 
simply reapply a Norwegian blueprint to achieve success. A brief examination of 
some of the preconditions Norway had that were crucial for success in the 
management process is therefore essential. However, this is not to say that a 
country must possess all of the outlined criteria, but the combined result is 
inevitably powerful for creating a unique and coherent political environment based 
on policy consensus.56  
A great number of factors contributed to a unique political environment of 
Norway prior to 1969.57 These include, but are not limited to: a well-developed 
system of governance, a highly efficient civil service system, a well-established 
                                                        
55 Erling Røed Larsen argues that Norway did escape the curse. “Norway, the Resource 
Curse, and the Dutch Disease,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 65, no. 3 
(2006). Elissaios Papyrakis, however, points out that Norway experienced several years of 
recession despite the good management. “The Resource Curse Hypothesis and its 
Transmission Channels,” Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 32, no. 1 (2004).  
56 Some of the factors are both country-specific and transferable, such as good governance. 
The point is here to differentiate between those factors that were present in Norway and 
historically deeply ingrained versus those that more easily can be adopted in a country’s 
policies within a short time period.  
57 For a more extensive list of factors, see Al-Kasim’s presentation: “Norad seminar: Olje for 
Utvikling”: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTNTFPSI/Resources/606764-
1150299531473/FaroukAl-Kasim.pdf. 
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judicial system, strong traditions in international norms and human rights, a 
tradition of state separation in industrial development, rich hydropower resources, 
a strong position in the Western world, a broad and well-developed educational 
system, maritime traditions, a good environment for technical advancement, and 
well-developed scientific and industrial research institutions. Popular belief 
suggests that Norway was relatively (from a Western European view) poor and 
lacking advanced technology prior to the “oil era.”58 Although this is true, the 
political context is important: the list shows the political context of a social 
democracy, rooted in a specific cultural tradition,59 allowed for the successful 
development to take place and, accordingly, the even distribution of the resources in 
the societal sphere.   
 
4.2 The NPD 
One of the most important administrative bodies in the management of the 
petroleum sector is the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD). The NPD was 
established in 1972 with the aim of: 
“creating the greatest possible values for society from the oil and gas activities by 
means of prudent resource management based on safety, emergency preparedness and 
safeguarding of the external environment.”60 
 
To ensure this outcome, the Directorate serves four main functions: 
                                                        
58 Helge Pharo, Contemporary European History. 
59 Nina Witoszek addresses in her book the cultural issues that have played a role in shaping 
the “epitome of welfare, equality, justice, environmental concern, and enlightened 
samaritanism.” Her findings take the reader back to European Romanticism, which claims 
the roots of important Norwegian values such as nature, peace and a Christian ethos. The 
Origins of the Regime of Goodness (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2011).  
60 The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, “About Us,” July 7, 2008 
http://www.npd.no/en/About-us/. 
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• Advisor to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy for integrity and 
interdepartmental assistance.  
• Responsible for data analysis of the NCS. Offshore activities are broadly 
based on these analyses.  
• A driving force for realizing resource potential with special regards to long-
term solutions, upside opportunities, and joint operations. 
• Overseer of petroleum activities when cooperating with other authorities to 
ensure comprehensive follow-up. 
 
The NPD also serves an important role in administering competence, mapping of 
resources, and collecting petroleum data for the Oil for Development Program. As 
such, the body is among the many functions that have contributed to the well-
managed petroleum wealth and the avoidance of the resource curse.  
 
4.3 Transferable Factors? 
The second category proves more important for this argument, as it points to 
good leadership and determination in the management of the resources. These are 
elements that more easily can be transferred to other oil states in a short time span, 
thus making them easier to transfer by the adoption and implementation of 
appropriate policies.  
 
4.3.1 Government Intervention 
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From the very beginning, the Norwegian government was insistent on 
assisting in the development process.61 A win-win situation was consequently 
created; oil companies competed for the licensees and made profit while the 
government received their appropriate share. Another key factor was the 
Norwegian government’s decision to demand a transfer of expertise from 
international to Norwegian companies. As such, Norway could gradually build up its 
own knowledge without being too reliant upon other international actors, thus 
limiting the chances of exploitation. By having the government as an active 
participant, a state-controlled oversight avoided an accelerated tempo of the 
development and uncontrolled distribution of private licensees. Transparency and 
predictability were promoted by the virtue of having a democratic tradition where 
the oil industry at all times was held accountable to the public. Moreover, 
government intervention helped create diversity in licensees. Diversity improves 
competition among a larger number of companies, thus increasing efficiency and 
avoiding negative consequences in regards to the monopoly of a few companies. 
Finally, the national legislature must establish and obtain a legal framework for both 
national and international oil companies to abide by. 
 
4.3.2 Managing the Socio-Economic Impact 
As in the previous point, the state plays an important role. Oil appears to 
many LDCs as a redeeming factor and a beacon of hope for a significant boost of the 
national GDP. This is also the danger. With large amounts of money streaming into 
                                                        
61 The Norwegian Parliament, Stortinget White Paper no. 28 (2010-2011). 
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the country, the chances for an over-heated economy rise rapidly, together with the 
threat of “Dutch disease.” To overcome all of these potential obstacles, the 
government needs to create a long-term plan that focuses not only on the oil 
industry, but also on how to ensure growth in other industry sectors. One approach 
to tackle this issue is to establish a sovereign wealth fund (SWF).62 Norway has been 
successful with this approach with the creation of the Government Pension Fund, 
commonly referred to as the oil fund.63 The fund has a dual function: it allows for the 
appropriate amount of oil revenue to be injected into the domestic economy to 
ensure stable growth and as a national “insurance policy” to buffer economic decline 
and the eventual decrease of incoming oil and gas revenue.64 Lastly, a sovereign 
wealth fund allows for investments that contribute to a more diversified economy 
where the oil industry is not the only contributing factor. For countries with few 
industry sectors, it is crucial to diversify in order to buffer the rise and fall in oil 
prices, consequently having large effects on the overall economy.  
 
                                                        
62 Oil-producing countries with an SWF include but are not limited to: United Arab Emirates, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Russia, Qatar, Libya, Algeria, Brunei, and Brunei.  
63 The Government Pension Fund of Norway consists of the Government Pension Fund 
(formerly the National Insurance Scheme Fund) and the Government Pension Fund Global, 
which is the continuation of the old Petroleum Fund. The latter is the inflow of all state 
petroleum revenues and the return on the fund’s investments. See: The Norwegian Ministry 
of Finance, “The Management of the Government Pension Fund – Global,” February 6, 2007, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-
fund/The-Management-Model.html?id=429362 
64 The amount of money decided to invest into the national economy is set by 
handlingsregelen (the budgetary rule), put forth by the Stoltenberg Government’s 
Parliamentary Proposition no. 29 (2000-2001): A maximum of four percent of the fund’s 
annual yield should be allocated into the government’s budget. See: The Norwegian Ministry 
of Finance, “Retningslinjer for Bruk av Oljepenger (Handlingsregelen) [in Norwegian], 
February 11, 2007, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/tema/norsk_okonomi/bruk-
av-oljepenger-/retningslinjer-for-bruk-av-oljepenger-ha.html?id=450468.  
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4.3.3 Broad National Participation 
The idea behind broad national participation is to have the whole country 
take agency in public matters and hold the government responsible. This is often a 
challenge for an LDC, which needs a higher level of commercial participation from 
the government as well as the private sector. Stronger economic growth will result, 
but the country must also incentivize its own oil-related industries to avoid being 
too dependent upon foreign companies and labor that often do the initial drilling 
and pumping.  
Increased transparency is another key factor where the media, the civil 
society, and the general public must hold both the government and the oil 
companies accountable to limit corruption and poor revenue management. A 
country is likely to run into a causality dilemma where the capital is to be a part of 
the state capacity building process, (e.g. combating corruption) while, on the other 
hand, political leaders often find it easy to enrich themselves. As corruption impedes 
all functions in building a broader state capacity, this target should have a high 
priority for the country, but people must realize their crucial role.  
The report has emphasized that all three of these approaches should be 
included in order to ensure the best outcome of newfound natural resources. 
However, the government of South Sudan should also keep an open dialogue with 
international actors for bilateral cooperation and assistance where necessary.  
 
5. Norway in South Sudan In 2011 
 
Norway’s development assistance in Sudan began in 1972, after the Addis Ababa 
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peace agreement.65 The Norwegian assistance in Sudan followed the “Norwegian 
Model”, based on money allocation from the MFA to NGOs working in the local areas. 
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) were both working 
in Sudan from the beginning, while the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and other 
organizations have joined in more recent years.  Both the Government of Sudan 
(GoS) and regional authorities requested NCA’s assistance in a long-term 
socioeconomic development program in Equatoria, a southern region of South 
Sudan.66 The program had a dual purpose: to repatriate refugees and support the 
peace process. Following the program, NCA signed a four-year contract with the GoS 
that would shift the focus from relief aid to development. The new contract involved 
a program where NCA would work in close cooperation with Sudanese authorities, 
who ultimately gave consent to each individual program. Priority was given to 
agriculture, co-operatives, and health by setting up regional bases, responsible for 
the local implementation (see Figure 3). In addition, the program also focused on 
infrastructure such as roads, education, and water.  Also NPA works closely with the 
civil society in South Sudan. They focus on the strengthening of civil society, 
focusing on democratization; gender equality and fair distribution of resources;67 
rural development, focusing on agricultural and economic development; and health 
                                                        
65 The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian 
Assistance to the Sudan,” November 1997, http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-
publications/publications/publication/_attachment/167381?_download=true&_ts=128152
065e2.  
66 The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum, “Norwegian NGOs,” November 10, 2011, 
http://www.norway-sudan.org/Embassy/Norway_in_Sudan/Civil-Society-
Relations/Norwegian_NGOs/. 
67 One of the programs is called “Oil for Common Good” where the NPA has arranged oil 
conferences, supporting oil task forces, and research of CSR of oil companies. Email 
correspondence with NPA and Nina Pedersen, December, 2011.  
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 care, including treatment of landmine
examples of the Norwegian Model, where a large p
allocated by Norad to utilize local knowledge.
revenue allocated to good governance while areas such as environment and energy, 
a sector seen in accordance with Norway’s focus on sustainable en
marginal.   
Figure 3: Bilateral assistance to Sudan 2010
  Source: Norad, “Norwegian Aid Statistics,” 
publications/norwegian-aid-statistics
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development, focusing on agricultural and economic reforms; health care; 
emergency aid; and clearing/EOD of landmines. Hence, Norwegian NGOs have all 
played integral parts in the development of Sudan. Their work must continue in 
South Sudan and that the MFA and Norad expand their existing initiatives, such as 
the Oil for Development initiative 
 
 
 
5.1 The Oil for Development Program 
 
 
The Oil for Development (OfD) program was launched by the MFA in 2005. The 
operative goal is to assist “developing countries [upon request] with petroleum 
resources (or potential) in their efforts to manage these resources in a way that 
generates economic growth and promotes the welfare of the population in general, 
and in a way that is environmentally sustainable.”68  The initiative requires 
participating countries to obey the following criteria for involvement:69 
• Cooperation must be demand-driven. 
• The country must be eligible according to OECD/DAC principles.70 
• Significant petroleum resources or potential must be present. 
• Norwegian experience and expertise must be relevant. 
                                                        
68 Norad, “The Norwegian Oil for Development Initiative: Factsheet,” Oslo, 2006, 
http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=109578  
69 Ibid. 
70 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance 
Committee is a forum where member states discuss various development projects, and this 
committee has outlined certain criteria for recipient countries. See: ibid.  
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• Demand for capacity and competence building in public institutions must be 
identified. 
All of the requirements must be met for any short or long-term involvement to take 
place. Short-term initiatives are based on information exchange by field visits, 
delegate exchange, and seminars of management and administration of petroleum 
resources. The requirements for long-term cooperation are the same, but the 
number of participating countries is limited due to capacity constraints.  The goal is 
to address more complicated issues, such as good governance, corruption, 
transparency, human rights, and the rule of law. Governmental obligation is 
essential and evidence of commitment to poverty reduction and improved wealth 
distribution must be seen throughout the cooperation. As of 2011, eight countries 
make up the “core countries” of the OfD, meaning they are subject to long-term 
capacity building under the pillars of revenue management, resource management, 
and environmental management.71  
 
5.2 Oil for Development in South Sudan 
 
 South Sudan is one of the eight core countries in the OfD program and in 2011 
received a significantly higher allocation than the year before, thus enhancing the 
Norwegian commitment to the region.72 The inception of the program took place in 
October 2008 when the MFA and the Sudanese Ministry of Petroleum and Mining 
                                                        
71 The core countries are Angola, Bolivia, Ghana, Mozambique, Rep. of Sudan, South Sudan, 
Timor-Leste, and Uganda. OfD also works with a number of other countries but with limited 
cooperation.  
72 For Sudan as a whole, the financial figures for 2010 were NOK 27 million while the 
allocated sum in 2011 was NOK 70 million. See: Norad, “Annex 2 Country-Specific Plans for 
2011,” http://www.norad.no/en/thematic-areas/energy/oil-for-development/news-
archive/_attachment/315297?_download=true&_ts=12f447c1489. 
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(MPM) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding cooperation in 
the petroleum industry.73 The MoU outlines three focus areas in the time period 
between 2010 and 2013: supporting the implementation of the CPA, technical 
support, and capacity building.  
 For the implementation of the CPA, Norwegian assistance has addressed both 
parties on post-2011 issues regarding the petroleum industry. The most important 
work has been to solve the split of the oil resources. NPA’s program “Oil as a 
Common Good” has played an important role in working with the GoSS Land 
Comission and other local organizations to find sustainable conflict solutions for the 
land disputes.74 While it is still ongoing, the issue is deemed a high priority in order 
to decrease the risk of further tension. Norway cooperated with the CPA mandated 
NPC (National Petroleum Commission) in an audit of the petroleum sector that 
specifically evaluated production, transportation and marketing of oil.75  
 Technical support was primarily given to an evaluation of Increased Oil 
Recovery (IOR) in the fields of Heglig, Unity and Niim. Phase one of the projects 
showed promising results, and it has been suggested to continue the exploration. 
                                                        
73 Although the MoU was signed between the GoS and the MFA, the conditions stipulate 
cooperation with South Sudan (the then autonomous government), as based on the CPA. 
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Sudanese Ministry of Energy and Mining 
regarding cooperation within the Petroleum Sector,” October 15, 2008,  
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/mou081015.pdf.  
74 Email correspondence with Nina Pedersen (NPA). See also: Norwegian People’s Aid, 
“ Rights to Land and Resources – Oil as a Common Good,” 
http://www.npaid.org/en/development/where_we_work/all_projects/projects_in_afrika/p
rojects_in_south_sudan/civil_society/?module=Articles&action=Article.publicShow&ID=17
203.  
75 The NPC was established by Presidential Decree No. 37 (2005) to be responsible for the 
creation of principles and guidelines regarding development and management that seeks to 
"serve the best interest of the people of Sudan." 
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The report suggested that IOR could be increased from 23 percent to over 30 
percent, resulting in an increase of $5 billon in revenue.76 77 Hence, there is a great 
potential for increasing revenue.  
 A capacity building program was prepared in cooperation with MPM and 
Nilpet. The program, spanning over a three to five year period, focuses on resource 
management and environmental management. NPA has also, under this chapter, 
played a central role, training journalists to cover oil-related issues to increase 
transparency and public awareness of the management.78 Much of the work will be 
comprised of seminars in Juba.  
 All of the three approaches are essential as they focus on the theme of 
establishing a broader state capacity with the necessary security while increasing 
the oil revenue to the benefit of the South Sudanese people. However, since much of 
this work requires a comprehensive approach the MFA and GoSS must coordinate 
efforts with international institutions.   
 
5.3 Working With International Institutions 
The 2010 OfD Working Plan shows that the initiative must seek cooperation with 
international institutions to draw on expertise and improving interaction outside 
                                                        
76 The report was prepared for both North and South, so the figures for South Sudan alone 
will vary. The Heglig field is in the Republic of Sudan.  
77 23 percent is the average recovery factor in Sudan, while the global average for crude oil 
is 30 percent and Norway averages at 46 percent. See: The Royal Norwegian Embassy in 
Khartoum, “Oil Recovery From Oil Fields in Sudan May Be Substantially Increased,” 
November 4, 2010, http://www.norway-sudan.org/News_and_events/Business/Oil-
recovery-from-oil-fields-in-Sudan-may-be-substantially-increased/. 
78 Email correspondence with Nina Pedersen (NPA).  
39
Kvelland: A New Nation, A Brighter Future?
Published by DigitalCommons@Macalester College, 2013
 
 
the realm of Norwegian competence.79 Norway is a small country with limited 
capabilities, making multilateral cooperation with international organizations 
imperative. Norad and the MFA must also acknowledge its limited capacities and 
seek cooperation to allow for a more comprehensive development approach. 
Another issue is that the Norwegian actors must find the balance between 
horizontal and vertical assistance. This report assumes that all interactions are 
based on consent from Juba and further suggests that certain assistance areas 
should be expanded, with one such area being revenue management and 
transparency.  
 
5.3.1 Petrad 
This non-profit organization was established in 1989 to transfer knowledge and 
experience about administration, management, and technology between experts in 
governments and national oil companies. Some of Petrad’s work includes 
competence-building seminars both in Norway and abroad that are tailored to the 
specific country.80  
 
5.3.2 RWI and EITI  
The OfD entered into a new three-year agreement with the Revenue Watch Institute 
(RWI) in 2010.  The cooperation focuses on empowering local oversight bodies, 
                                                        
79Norad, “Oil for Development (OfD) Work Plan and Financial Overview 2010,” Oslo, 2010, 
http://www.norad.no/en/thematic-areas/energy/oil-for-
development/_attachment/164841?_download=true&_ts=1278f19954c. 
80 The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum, “Petroleum Workshop in Khartoum,” 
January 7, 2007, http://www.norway-sudan.org/News_and_events/Business/workshop/. 
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supporting civil society, and collaboration between the African Extractive Resources 
Facility and the Natural Resource Charter. Similarly, the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Institution (EITI) strives to create a greater transparency through 
verification and publication of extracted natural resources. The initiative rests on 
the pillars of government publication of information, public disclosure by the 
private sector, and the role of civil society as a watchdog.81 It is important for the 
authorities in Juba to realize the importance of these organizations as it shows 
commitment to the international community for more transparent petroleum 
policies. With public disclosure, the oil wealth can consequently be spread on more 
equal grounds.   
 
5.3.3 IMF and the World Bank 
The OfD program continues to work with the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) with the aim of adhering to the best international expertise. 
The Petroleum Governance Initiative (PGI) is a bilateral initiative between the OfD 
program and the World Bank, aiming at good petroleum governance under the 
pillars of sector governance, environmental management, and community 
development.82 The IMF has a corresponding trust fund, Managing Natural Resource 
Wealth (MNRW), aiming to build state capacity on micro-economy, tax-policy, 
                                                        
81 Global Witness, “The EITI in South Sudan: Basics and Benefits,” London, 2011, 
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/110518%20EITI%20 
Memo.pdf. 
82 Eleodoro Mayorga Alba, “Petroleum Governance Initiative: Assessment of Environmental 
Governance and Management System in Oil Producing Countries,” World Bank, presentation 
during Extractive Industry Week, 2009.  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOGMC/Resources/336929-
1237387264558/5930373-1237390781455/mayorga_pgi.pdf 
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negotiations, and fund management.83  South Sudan is presently not engaged in any 
of these initiatives. Capacity building in the petroleum sector is among their top 
priorities, and establishing good relationships within international organizations is, 
therefore, a key to success.  
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Norwegian NGOs have played an important role in South Sudan and must continue 
to do so. Working to establish better schools, hospitals, and infrastructure should all 
be a part of the capacity building strategy. However, while increased funding is a 
step in the right direction, the MFA must understand its limitations and ensure that 
planning, funding, and execution is done with a strong commitment on a long-term 
basis. One of its top priorities should be to work with both North and South to abide 
by the principles of the third chapter in the CPA regarding wealth sharing. Hence, 
limiting North-South tension must be avoided at all cost for sustainable 
development to take place.  
Furthermore, Norway must continue to provide technical support. The 
emphasis should be on finding ways to increase IOR in order to generate more 
revenue. Similarly, the incoming revenue must be disclosed to avoid corruption. 
South Sudan should, therefore, apply for membership with the EITI. By doing so, the 
country ensures that the broader population can enjoy the wealth benefits; it sends 
a positive signal that will attract foreign investment; and it puts South Sudan in the 
                                                        
83 IMF, “Managing Natural Resource Wealth,” program document, 2010,  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/otm/2010/110110.pdf.  
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company of similar oil states, which allows for better opportunities for cooperation. 
Finally, South Sudan should open up to the  multilateral initiatives proposed by the 
MFA in collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank. These programs will serve 
as good frameworks in the process of building a strong state capacity that can deal 
with the management of the new revenue. 
 
 
6. Looking Ahead 
 
Looking ahead, policy-makers should consider both oil and non-oil related issues. 
Given the potential impact of well-managed oil revenue, Norway should expand its 
role in assisting South Sudan by improving oil recovery, while bearing in mind the 
environmental implications of IOR. Depending on the economic progress, an oil fund 
should be established to avoid an overheated national economy. Finally, since the oil 
is expected to peak in the near future, the government must start planning on how 
to use the resource wealth to diversify the economy. Suggested fields are agriculture, 
minerals, and hydropower.   
 
6.1 Increased Oil Recovery 
As outlined in sections 5.2 and 5.4, South Sudan has a great potential for increasing 
its oil recovery from an average of 23 percent to over 30 percent.84 GNPOC blocks 
                                                        
84 According to research done by Halliburton, the recovery might be as much as 40 percent. 
See: Reuters, “S. Sudan Talks to Halliburton to Boost Oil Production,” Reuters, October 28, 
2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/28/sudan-south-oil-
idUSL5E7LS3K420111028. 
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1,2, and 4 look especially promising for enhanced recovery methods.85 Although the 
technology between offshore North Sea drilling and onshore drilling in South Sudan 
differs vastly, the Norwegian example of increasing oil recovery from 18 percent at 
the initiation to almost 50 percent today speaks to the strategic importance of 
utilizing advanced technology. The MPM should, therefore, thoroughly explore the 
possibility of letting international companies, in collaboration with Nilepet and 
other national companies, increase the oil recovery. 
 Short-term focus should be to start water injections as soon as possible. This 
method is fairly inexpensive, but requires investment in wells and water 
purification technology. A more long-term plan is to inject with modified water, 
which increases the recovery percentage. Although this plan is more costly and 
requires comprehensive planning, the expected return is exponentially greater.86 
However, good cooperation between all stakeholders with the necessary investment 
and competence is a precondition for the project to succeed. Another precondition, 
as pointed out in section 2.2, is consensus in Juba where the various government 
institutions must collaborate on mutual policy platform.  
 
6.2 Diversification of the Economy 
As of 2011, 98 percent of South Sudan’s revenue comes from the oil industry. With 
the projected rapid decline of the oil, it is imperative for the country to expand its 
other industries. Even if the oil timeline is extended, the economy will be too fragile, 
due to oil price fluctuations, to almost fully rely on oil export. This report suggests 
                                                        
85 The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum, November, 2010. See map.  
86 Email correspondence with Odd Skontorp (Odd Skontorp [Oil] Consulting), December, 
2011.  
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three sectors of expansion that Juba should take into consideration: agriculture, 
mining, and hydropower. 
 
6.2.1 Agriculture 
  Agriculture has been called the “backbone” of South Sudanese economy, but the 
potential is inconsistent with the current food scarcity.87 While agriculture only 
accounts for a small percentage of the GDP, the sector employs as many as 85 
percent of the country.88 Due to good climate and geographical conditions, the GoSS 
has announced that it wishes to strengthen the agricultural sector, and in 2011 
increased the financial allocation by 50 percent.89 The World Bank is one of the 
international institutions eager to assist the country. A likely approach to further the 
development of the agricultural sector is a coordinated donor support commitment 
to stabilize the economy due to instability in the oil prices.90 The aid would serve as 
a temporary buffer for the country to develop its alternative sources of revenues 
(also including hydro power and mining).  
 
Agriculture sector development is the antidote to the famous resource curse, that 
natural resource endowed countries like South Sudan could suffer from.91  
                                                        
87Betty Achan Ogwaro, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. See: USAID, “USAID Supports 
South Sudan’s First Agricultural Tade Fair,” press release, November 9, 2011,  
http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2011/pr111109_1.html. Also, email correspondence 
with Alberto Behar, IMF: storage and infrastructure are important as much of the food 
never reaches out in the rural areas.  
88 Nargis Alphonse, “South Sudan: First Agricultural Trade Fair Kicks Off in South Sudan,” All 
Africa, press release, November 10, 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201111100860.html. 
89 Jill Shankleman, “Oil and State Building in South Sudan,” United States Institute of Peace, 
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011).  
90 Jill Shankleman, USIP 
91 Agence France Presse (AFP), “World Bank: South Sudan’s Future in Agriculture Not Oil,” 
The Daily Star, September 6, 2010, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-
East/Sep/06/World-Bank-South-Sudans-future-in-agriculture-not-oil.ashx#axzz1eTr0Y0v1. 
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Furthermore, new government policies should encourage families to increase their 
production of crops in order to sell a surplus; hence, local trade will be enhanced. 
Norwegian efforts should assist existing initiatives, such as those of USAID, that seek 
to improve productivity; support marked-led agriculture; develop a commercial 
domestic seed and fertilizer industry; and improve infrastructure for farmers to 
transport their products to markets.92 Drawing on its expertise in hydropower, 
Norway should assist in building dams for both irrigation and power. 
 
6.2.2 Mining 
South Sudan has an abundance of minerals that include copper, gold, silver, 
aluminum, iron, uranium, chromium ore, zinc, mica, diamond, and quartz.93 The 
GoSS drafted in the fall of 2011 a legislative bill seeking to open up for mining. The 
bill welcomes foreign investment by offering a lower tax than many neighboring 
countries. Although South Sudan must develop its own mining industry with 
cooperation between the government and private companies, it should welcome as 
they bring necessary expertise. As pointed out in section 4.0, foreign expertise is 
essential in the initial phase of natural resource extraction, although the GoSS must 
work closely with national companies to allow them to develop their own expertise. 
Consequently, some international companies have been granted exploration 
                                                        
92 USAID, 2011.  
93 According to a government factsheet. See: Jeremy Clarke, “South Sudan Hopes to Pass 
‘Attractive’ Mining Act by October,” July 14, 2011, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/14/uk-southsudan-mining-
idUKTRE76D42I20110714. 
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licenses for gold and uranium. This is a step in the right direction, and, once one or 
two companies can report positive results, it will increase the interest of other 
companies. Recently there has been a problem of several ministries producing their 
own sets of regulations, which have impeded and discouraged industry 
development.  In this process, Norway should play a similar role as in the petroleum 
industry. It should assist with the establishment of consistent licensing rules from 
the GoSS that require transparency, demand assistance for national companies, and 
work to avert potential effects of Dutch disease.  
  
6.2.3 Hydro Power 
Reports on the potential of hydropower and electric generation are somewhat 
vague, but the potential nonetheless exists. President Kiir has been in dialogue with 
the government of Uganda to look at the potential of a bilateral effort of constructing 
hydropower stations along the White Nile.94 Hydropower is currently the main 
source of power in Uganda, but the country is seeking to expand their hydropower 
capacity (e.g. with the production of Bujagali and Karuma power projects95). 
Regional cooperation will strengthen the bonds between the two countries with 
positive outcomes such as increased trade and reciprocal investment. Norway, 
whose electricity is 99 percent hydropower, should seek to assist South Sudan upon 
                                                        
94 Julius Uma, “South Sudan’s Kiir, Museveni Discuss Hydro-Electric Power Plans,” Sudan 
Tribune, December 21, 2010, http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-s-Kiir-
Museveni,37349. 
95 The Bujagali power station (250 MW) is planned to be fully operational in 2012, while the 
Kumara project (650 MW) has a commission target date of 2017. See: “Bujagali Power 
Project,” Kenya Engineer, December 5, 2011, http://www.kenyaengineer.co.ke/news/2-
news/133-bujagali-power-project. 
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request by drawing on its knowledge of hydropower. This will stabilize the energy 
supply, especially in rural areas. Businesses reliant upon expansive diesel 
generators will save money, foreign companies will be more inclined to invest, and 
the general public will experience increased access to electricity.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 Norway has shown its commitment to the OfD initiative, but has only vaguely 
addressed the long-term development schemes. While the good work must continue, 
the MFA and Norad should also address what happens once the oil is gone. Planning 
for this is urgent, as the oil supply is expected to be declining soon. To avoid 
spreading the Norwegian efforts too thin, sufficient financial allocation is necessary. 
Norway must realize the importance of focusing on the development of both oil 
industry and non-oil industries. Parts of the aid from Norway and other donor 
countries should be utilized to stabilize a fragile economy. A priority is to conduct 
comprehensive assessments of how to develop the sectors of agriculture and mining. 
Multilateral cooperation between Norway, the GoSS, and international institutions is 
deemed necessary to draw upon a wide array of knowledge. Lastly, Norway should 
seek to initiate a bilateral hydropower initiative, following guidelines from the OfD 
in order to sustain the build-up of new businesses and industry in South Sudan.   
  
7. Recommendations 
 
The following recommendations are targeted for the Norwegian MFA, Norad, 
Norwegian NGOs, and the relevant ministries of the GoSS. The suggested timeline 
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for actions is short (one year) to medium (three to five years), but the 
recommendations should be situated into a long-term (20-30 years) perspective as 
a part of the overall state capacity building. The essential theme is to use the oil 
revenue in the interest of a broad societal spectrum, based on a social democratic 
model, where new industries should be established with the petroleum capital. 
Along with this, the humanitarian aspect must be taken into account, as the 
overarching goal is to improve humanitarian condition. Building schools, hospitals, 
and infrastructure is all an important part of this process. However, to ensure the 
sustainability of the recommended steps, there must be a strong focus on creating 
good and peaceful relations, both domestically and with the Republic of Sudan. 
Among other steps, the Government of South Sudan should consider the following: 
 
Short-term:  
 
• Abiding by the principles outlined in the CPA to gradually establish a better 
relationship with the Republic of Sudan. Solving the border dispute in the 
Abyei region is a key factor. 
• Creating unity within their own government, where policy making is done in 
a united and cohesive manner. This is especially important in regards to 
resource management.  
• Establishing a production share agreement (PSA) with the Republic of Sudan 
to solve ongoing and future disputes concerning the division of natural 
resources. The fees for use of pipeline and refineries are essential points in 
this agreement. 
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• Committing to the EITI and increased transparency to demonstrate that 
South Sudan is a reputable oil state, thus limiting corruption.  
• Establishing sub-agencies of the MPM and continued to support of the NPC to 
ensure a strong government presence in the distribution of licenses, a 
demand to transfer and develop national petroleum expertise, and build 
strong connections to international oil companies. 
Medium-term: 
• Providing security for international oil companies to create a hospitable 
investment environment. 
• Continuing to diversify the economy with a focus on further developing the 
agriculture, mining, and hydropower sectors to buffer the revenue swings 
from an over-dependent oil economy.   
• Allowing for unrestricted freedom of the press and encourage broad 
participation from civil society to create a more accountable and transparent 
government. 
• Establishing comprehensive macroeconomic policies to further prevent the 
resource curse and Dutch disease. 
 
The Norwegian actors should consider the following recommendations for future 
actions in South Sudan: 
Short-term: 
• Commissioning a comprehensive report in collaboration with the MPM on 
how to best tailor Norwegian petroleum expertise to South Sudan. 
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• Drawing on advanced technology from the North Sea to substantially 
increase IOR, especially in GNPOC blocks 1,2, and 4. 
• Creating concrete timelines for the respective involvement projects so as 
to ensure a clear time perspective that is necessary for the GoSS to utilize 
in order to gradually become less reliant on international aid and 
assistance. Collaboration between the various Norwegian actors is 
essential, and also between Norway and international organizations.  
Medium-term: 
• Continuing to oversee the implementation of the CPA to ensure regional 
stability.  
• Expanding the overall Norwegian assistance in South Sudan with 
increased manpower and resource allocation for the medium term to give 
South Sudan the necessary backing in the initial startup phase. 
• Assisting South Sudanese authorities with management-based seminars 
on how to develop good capacity to distribute the resource wealth. 
• Assisting Nilepet with competence to make it competitive against 
international competition to gradually build up the national oil industry. 
• Expanding the Norwegian assistance upon request from the GoSS to aid in 
the diversification of the economy, especially by providing expertise and 
technology to develop the hydropower industry. 
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